



The UK’s core-periphery economic divide 
shows no signs of narrowing. Indeed, 
it is widening (Financial Times, 2015). 
Evidence shows that second tier cities – 
many of which are in northern regions 
- performed worse during the recession 
than London (Champion and Townsend, 
2013) and are now lagging behind 
London in terms of job creation during 
the recovery (Townsend and Champion, 
2013, Centre for Cities, 2015). So where 
are the new jobs to come from?
The major thrust of policy in recent 
decades has been to support people to 
start new businesses and to help existing 
small firms to grow. However, the policy 
focus has now switched to support for 
high growth firms. This has been for 
two reasons. First, it has been claimed 
that subsidising business start-ups has 
proved to be both costly and ineffective. 
Shane (2009, p. 158) argues that “there 
is a lot of evidence that these policies 
lead people to start marginal businesses 
that are likely to fail, have little economic 
impact, and generate little employment.” 
Second, as he goes on to argue, “we 
need to recognise that only a select few 
entrepreneurs will create businesses that 
…. create jobs, reduce unemployment, 
make markets more competitive, 
and enhance economic growth” 
(Shane, 2008, p.163). There is now 
considerable evidence (e.g. Henrekson 
and Johansson, 2010, Anyadike-Danes 
et al., 2009, Hart and Anyadike-Danes, 
2014) that most jobs are created by just 
a small proportion of high growth firms 
(HGFs). Hence, as Storey and Greene 
(2010, p. 208) observe: “there is little 
doubt that small businesses that become 
middle-sized and ultimately large 
businesses, over a comparatively short 
period of time, are central to economic 
prosperity…. Ultimately, the ability of 
a [region or] country to nurture the 
growth of such businesses is probably 
the most important element in enterprise 
development.”
The dominant approach of policy makers 
in peripheral regions to support the 
emergence of HGFs has been to establish 
government sponsored venture capital 
funds (GSVCFs). The rationale is two-
fold. First, it reflects the commonly held 
assumption that venture capital is a key 
driver for HGFs (which are assumed to 
be young and operating in a high tech 
sector) (OECD, 2011, Brown and Mason, 
2014). Second, it is a response to the 
lack of venture capital in peripheral 
regions. This is an outcome of both 
the overall decline in the availability of 
venture capital because the poor returns 
achieved by fund managers in the post-
dotcom era have made it much harder 
for them to raise new investment funds 
(Mason, 2009) and the longstanding 
high level of geographical concentration 
of venture capital investments (Mason, 
2007, Aveitchikova, 2012) that, in a 
UK context, favours London and the 
South East (Mason, 2007, Mason and 
Pierrakis, 2013). Recent official reports 
identify structural gaps in the availability 
of equity capital in the £250,000 - £2m 
range and £2m to £10m range (SQW, 
2009; BIS, 2012). Venture capital 
investments in peripheral regions of 
the UK are dominated by government 
sponsored funds either investing on 
their own or in conjunction with private 
investors (Mason and Pierrakis, 2013).
At least four generic models of 
government sponsored venture capital 
can be recognised. First, it can take 
the form of an investment fund that is 
financed by public money and managed 
by government employees. Second, it 
can involve professional fund managers 
being hired or contracted to invest public 
money. Third are hybrid funds, in which 
the finance comprises both private and 
public money, but structured in such a way 
that the public money takes the first loss 
and the private sector money takes the 
first gain, and is managed by professional 
investors. Fourth are co-investment 
funds, in which the government 
sponsored fund invests alongside 
private sector investors, typically on 
the same terms and conditions, but in 
a passive way. The trend over time has 
been for the government increasingly 
to operate at arm’s length, initially in 
terms of fund management and now 
also in terms of using public money to 
leverage private funds. However, there is 
growing evidence that regardless of the 
approach, GSVCFs have been ineffective 
in stimulating entrepreneurship-led 
economic development (Nightingale et 
al., 2009, Brander et al., 2014, Grilli and 
Murtinu, 2014, Munari and Toshi, 2015).
The remainder of this paper considers 
why GSVCFs have had such a modest 
economic impact. First, it questions the 
operations and investment focus of the 
funds. It then questions whether there 
is sufficient demand for venture capital 
and whether the demand is investment 
ready. Finally, it questions whether the 
build-to-sell approach that is at the 
core of the venture capital investment 
model is appropriate as an economic 
development strategy.
Government sponsored venture 
capital funds: a critique
Inappropriate investment focus
GSVCFs can be criticised for having an 
inappropriate investment focus. First, 
government typically focuses on ‘small’ 
investments, often below £1m. This is 
too small to meet the funding needs of 
growing firms, especially technology-
based firms, and also prevents them 
from making follow-on investments 
(SWQ Consulting, 2009). In any case, 
this sub-£1m investment market is 
relatively well served by business angels 
even in peripheral regions, particularly 
now that they have started to invest 
as groups often in conjunction with co-
investment funds.
Second, most GSVCFs focus on 
technology sectors, on the implicit 
assumption that there is a strong 
association between ‘high tech’ and 
high growth firms (Henrekson and 
Johansson, 2010; Mason and Brown, 
2013). However, this assumption is not 
supported by empirical evidence (Brown 
and Mason, 2014; Daunfeldt et al., 
2015). HGFs are heterogeneous in terms 
of sector and also size, age and location. 
The preoccupation of policy-makers with 
technology sectors is therefore potentially 
depriving innovative businesses in more 
traditional sectors that have high growth 
potential of the opportunity to raise 
finance.
Third, GSVCFs tend to target new and 
young businesses. However, research 
in Scotland noted that a significant 
minority of high growth firms are 
either management buyouts (MBOs), 
management buyins or employee buyouts 
(Mason et al., 2015). But typically 
GSVCFs are precluded from investing 
to buy out existing shareholders. As 
a consequence these firms are not 
eligible for investment by these funds. 
Yet, ownership change, either uniting 
management with ownership or replacing 
owner-managers who perhaps wish to 
retire, are significant mechanisms for 
triggering growth.
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Fourth, GSVCFs schemes are often 
set up, mimicking the private sector, 
as limited life (10 year) rather than 
evergreen funds. This requires them to 
focus their investment activity on just a 
few years, after which they are closed to 
new investments and only make follow-
on investments, and then seek to exit by 
means of a trade sale. The consequence 
is that the opportunity to nurture and 
develop larger locally owned businesses 
is lost.
The Broken Funding Escalator
The funding of a growth business is 
often a series of steps, starting with 
family, founder and friends (the 3Fs), 
moving on to business angel investment, 
then one or more rounds of venture 
capital funding, development capital 
and mezzanine finance and finally an 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) or the sale 
of the business. Fast growing companies 
will rarely raise just one round of 
funding. However, most funders position 
themselves to only invest a certain 
amount per company (e.g. less than 
£250,000, £250,000 to £500,000, less 
than £1m, £2m-£5m, over £5m) or invest 
only in businesses at particular stages 
in their development (e.g. seed, early 
growth, development). Business angels 
lack deep pockets and are unlikely to 
make follow-on investments. In the case 
of venture capital funds, some will invest 
in the £1m to £5m range while others 
make much bigger investments. Very 
often they will only invest in companies 
that are revenue positive. As noted 
above, GSVCFs organise themselves in 
the same way, positioning themselves 
only to make certain sizes of investments 
and in businesses that have particular 
characteristics.
This situation creates a number of 
negative outcomes. First, entrepreneurs 
of growing businesses have to engage 
in new efforts to raise finance every 
nine to twelve months which takes 
their attention away from managing the 
business. It also creates considerable 
insecurity since an unsuccessful attempt 
at raising finance would constrain future 
growth and even threaten the survival 
of the business, thereby putting at risk 
investments made by previous investors. 
Second, because each investor is unable 
to make follow-on investments they are 
at risk of being diluted in subsequent 
rounds of investment. Third, the supply 
of risk capital is skewed to sub-£1m 
investments, while the shift of venture 
capital funds to larger, more profitable 
investments has left a gap in the 
£1m-£5m funding range (SQW, 2009, 
BIS, 2012). This creates ‘the Series A 
crunch’ with too many companies that 
have successfully raised smaller amounts 
of finance now seeking to raise rounds 
in excess of £1m. Because the supply 
of these larger investments is so limited 
many companies might not secure follow-
on funding, which increases the possibility 
of a low-value distress sale. The focus of 
GSVCFs on small investments therefore 
does nothing to address the needs of 
businesses seeking £1m-£10m to scale-
up and internationalise their activities 
which many commentators regard as the 
most significant finance gap for HGFs.
Connectivity
This narrowing of the supply pyramid is 
a national rather than simply a regional 
problem. However, it presents its most 
extreme form in peripheral regions. To 
the extent that the investment process 
is constrained by distance, this is more 
significant in the case of small scale early 
stage investments than larger follow 
on investments. Indeed, 70% of UK 
business angels invest locally (Harrison 
et al., 2010). This reflects the importance 
of local presence for identifying new 
businesses that are seeking finance and 
also the active hands-on involvement of 
early stage investors, which is facilitated 
by proximity. Hence regions need to have 
their own indigenous sources of start-
up and early stage finance which will 
typically be supplied by business angels 
and seed funds.
The value added contribution of follow-
on investors is likely to be in a form 
that does not require their proximity 
(e.g. professionalization of the 
business, strategic insights, networks). 
Hence, businesses looking for follow-
on investments should be seeking 
potential investors outside of the 
region. However, such investors place 
a high emphasis on trusted networks 
for deal flow and potential co-investors. 
Peripheral regions therefore need to 
develop funding ‘pipelines’ (Bathelt et 
al., 2004) that link the key players in 
the regional entrepreneurial eco-system 
(e.g. universities, incubators, angel 
groups, local venture capital firms, etc.) 
to venture capital funds based in London 
and overseas and to key individuals who 
can gain access to these investors.
Smart Money
Money is often thought of as being 
homogeneous, hence, it does not 
matter who provides the finance for a 
business. However, for entrepreneurial 
finance this is not the case. There is a 
fundamental distinction between ‘smart’ 
money, where the investor contributes 
both finance and non-financial support 
(e.g. advice, knowledge, contacts), 
and ‘dumb’ money where the investor 
offers nothing above and beyond the 
money. What is required to build strong 
entrepreneurial companies is not just 
any type of money from any source, but 
smart money supplied by investors who 
have the skills, knowledge and contacts 
to be able to add value to the businesses 
in which they invest.
The question for GSVCFs is whether 
they add the same level of value-added 
as private venture capital funds. The 
evidence points to the conclusion that 
they are not as ‘smart’ as private sector 
venture capital in terms of adding value 
(Shäfer and Shilder, 2009; Luukkonen 
et al., 2013). The ability of GSVCFs to 
attract capable investment managers 
is constrained by the small size of 
funds under management because the 
annual management fee is based on a 
percentage of the committed capital (up 
to 2%), which, in turn, limits the rewards 
and incentives that they can offer. The 
capabilities of the managers of GSVCFs 
are therefore often questioned, both 
in terms of their ability to make good 
investments (quality of deal flow, domain
knowledge, effectiveness of their due 
diligence) and to add value to their 
investee companies (e.g. mentoring 
skills, strategic insights, networks). 
These considerations have prompted 
governments to outsource management 
to private sector fund managers. But 
here again, issues of fund size remain 
relevant. Inconsistent incentives are also 
a major issue. There is almost inevitably a 
disconnect between the incentives of the 
people managing the funds on behalf of 
the government, which are to maximize 
returns on capital, and government 
itself, which seeks to generate economic 
growth and jobs (Forbes, 2013). On 
the other hand, Lerner (2009) argues 
that the problem is that government 
fails to build in incentives for managers 
to enhance the performance of the 
fund’s investee companies because 
they get well-remunerated even if these 
companies fail.
Demand-side constraints
The creation of GSVCFs assumes that 
there is a significant pool of potential high 
growth businesses that can put venture 
capital to good use to build businesses of 
scale. However, there is not necessarily a 
large number of businesses particularly 
in peripheral regions that either want 
or need to access venture capital. Even 
more significantly, peripheral regions are 
unlikely to contain sufficient businesses 
that offer the type of returns that venture 
capital funds seek. Accordingly, without 
sufficient and appropriate demand, 
simply creating new sources of finance 
may not result in a significant increase in 
high growth businesses.
Venture capital investing is about 
building companies of scale. It is high 
risk. Most investee companies do not 
achieve high growth and many fail. 
The success of an investment portfolio 
therefore depends on achieving one 
or two ‘winners’, the returns from 
which will more than compensate for 
the unsuccessful businesses. Venture 
capital therefore is – or should be – 
highly selective. However, the reality 
is that the vast majority of businesses 
are not attractive financial propositions. 
They will not meet the strict investment 
criteria for venture capital, and never 
will on account of either their lack of 
innovative or original ideas or the limited 
industry and management experience of 
their entrepreneurial team, or both. This 
is particularly the case in economically 
lagging cities and regions where the 
low level of entrepreneurial activity 
contributes to their weak economic 
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position. This means that increasing the 
supply of finance is likely to have little or 
no effect on a region’s overall business 
performance. This is confirmed by one 
study which found that the companies 
that were recipients of funding under one 
or more of six UK government-backed 
hybrid venture capital schemes did not 
exhibit significantly better performance, 
suggesting “that the UK does not possess 
untapped resource of high potential firms 
whose (greater) performance will be 
unleashed by simply making available 
more equity finance within the ‘equity 
gap’” (Nightingale et al., 2009).
In summary, the number of companies 
that have the potential to achieve 
sufficient growth to deliver the scale 
of returns sought by venture capital is 
limited, especially in peripheral regions. 
The danger is therefore that having 
created a venture capital fund, the 
pressure to invest will cause the money 
to go to poorer quality businesses which 
do not have the potential to grow to a 
significant scale. This problem will be 
especially acute if the fund’s ability to 
invest is geographically circumscribed. 
This, in turn, will produce poorer 
outcomes - few growing businesses will 
emerge and few new jobs will be created. 
Research that has noted that GSVCFs 
have greater difficulty in achieving exits 
(Brander et al., 2014) is consistent with 
this scenario. The lack of exits, the small 
size of those exits that occur and the lack 
of large exits will all adversely affect the 
fund’s financial returns as well as limiting 
entrepreneurial recycling possibilities. 
This leads to the conclusion that creating 
GSVCFs will not have as great an impact 
on economic development as is often 
assumed.
Investment Readiness
A further problem on the demand side 
is that many of the businesses which do 
come forward to seek venture capital 
are judged by investors as not being 
‘investment ready’. These are businesses 
that investors intuitively recognise as 
having potential but require significant 
additional development to get to the 
point where they could attract finance. 
They comprise, at one extreme, 
businesses which have presentational 
failings, typically incomplete information 
and, at the other extreme, businesses 
lacking the skills and composition of their 
management team, route to market, 
and status of their IP or governance 
arrangements.
There have been various attempts to 
deliver investment readiness schemes in 
the UK. Their effectiveness is underlined 
by evidence from the Business Angel 
Investment Activity Report published by 
BIS (Mason and Harrison, 2010). This 
showed that business angel networks 
that provided investment readiness 
programmes put a lower proportion of 
the businesses that approached them 
forward to their investors, but a higher 
proportion of these businesses were 
successful in raising finance. However, 
there are criticisms of many of the 
investment programmes that have been 
created (Mason and Kwok, 2010; Mason 
and Harrison, 2001). For example, 
their emphasis has too often been on 
addressing presentational failings rather 
than the more fundamental – and much 
harder to address - investability issues. 
At their worst, they have been little 
more than an exercise in how to write 
a business plan. Very often there has 
been no follow-up of the businesses to 
see whether they have implemented 
the suggestions from the programme or 
whether they need support in doing so. 
Moreover, some are criticised for being 
delivered by government sponsored-
employed business advisers rather 
than by hands-on investors. Effective 
investment readiness programmes need 
to be able to put entrepreneurs in front of 
both investors and individuals who have 
successfully raised finance and grown 
businesses. Finally, investment readiness 
programmes are targeted at companies 
raising their first round of finance, 
typically from business angels. However, 
their content is unlikely to be relevant 
for companies that are seeking to raise 
£1m plus from venture capital funds. 
Thus, there is a need for well-designed 
and resourced investment readiness 
programmes. These should focus on 
more than just the initial funding stage 
and cover follow-on funding rounds and 
also a stock market listing.
Building to sell
Central to the venture capital investment 
model of business angels and venture 
capital firms (including GSVCFs) is 
the requirement to achieve an exit to 
realise financial returns for investors. A 
financial support system that is based 
on a venture capital model will therefore 
be investing in businesses with growth 
potential that will ultimately be sold to 
larger companies. Only a small number 
of angel and venture capital exits occur 
by means of a flotation on the stock 
market (a so-called IPO). Indeed, over 
time venture capital firms have become 
much less attracted to taking their 
companies to an IPO (Chaplinasky and 
Gupta-Mulerjee, 2013, Bessler and 
Seim, 2014). Hence, whereas in the 
short term initiatives to increase the 
supply of venture capital should result 
in an increase in the number of young, 
growing businesses, in the longer term 
those businesses that offer the greatest 
prospects of commercial success are 
likely to be sold (often to overcome 
funding constraints), perpetuating the 
high level of external ownership of 
the region’s businesses. Although the 
empirical evidence is patchy, there is a 
strong case for arguing that the external 
acquisition of young growing companies 
can have an adverse effect on regional 
economic development in the longer 
term (Foreman-Peck and Nicholls, 2013, 
Xiao, 2015). This is particularly the case 
for small, young companies whose main 
assets are in the form of intellectual 
property, and are not embedded in the 
regional economy: both characteristics 
means that they could easily be uprooted 
and moved elsewhere. Moreover, small 
exits are unlikely to generate significant 
wealth for shareholders and investors, 
thereby limiting the potential for 
entrepreneurial recycling (Mason and 
Harrison, 2006).
Indeed, if a key objective is to support 
high growth companies it is surprising 
that more attention is not given to 
helping such firms to gain access to 
the IPO market. A listing of a business 
on a public stock market – undertaken 
through an Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
– is regarded as an important launch 
pad for further business growth and 
expansion to create regional ‘anchor’ 
businesses. An IPO provides access 
to further finance, acquisitions can be 
made using shares, the governance 
requirements and disciplines required 
of a publicly-listed company are seen as 
beneficial and the positive signals from 
being listed may open up new market 
opportunities. Meanwhile external 
investors are able to achieve liquidity and 
recycle capital gains in other businesses. 
A recent US study (Kenny et al., 2012) 
found that ‘entrepreneurial growth 
companies’ that had IPOs between 2001 
and 2010 increased their employment 
by an average of 45%, or 822 jobs 
per firm, after their IPO. However, the 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM), 
which was created by the London Stock 
Market in 1995 as a public market for 
smaller growing companies, offering 
greater regulatory flexibility and no set 
requirements for capitalisation or the 
number of shares issued compared with 
the main market, is characterised by a 
geographical bias. AIM listed companies 
in the UK are heavily skewed to London 
and the South East, accounting for 
around 60%, whereas all other regions 
have lower proportions than their share 
of GVA (Amini et al., 2012). Wales 
accounts for just 1.7% of all IPOs on 
AIM from the market’s creation in 1995 
to 2008. From a regional economic 
development perspective the lack of 
publicly-listed companies has to be 
regarded as representing a source of 
economic weakness and is a contributory 
factor to the persistence of the ‘north-
south’ economic divide in the UK.
One possible explanation is that peripheral 
regions do not produce sufficient HGFs 
that meet AIM listing requirements. 
Certainly, the proportion of HGFs in all 
of the UK regions is much lower than in 
Greater London (Mason et al., 2015), the 
proportion of companies in peripheral 
regions that feature in ‘fast growth’ lists 
such as the Virgin Fast Track is also less 
than its ‘expected’ share. Alternatively, 
potential AIM companies in the region 
may get acquired before they reach the 
point when they can consider an IPO. 
Understanding why there is a deficiency 
of publicly-listed companies in peripheral 
regions and seeking to overcome 
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whatever obstacles are discovered 
should be a policy priority. Of course, 
public companies are not immune from 
acquisition but because such companies 
are relatively large and well embedded 
in their region, they are more likely to 
prosper under new ownership should 
they be acquired. Moreover, this risk is 
mitigated by the fact that they are in a 
better position as a result of their public 
listing to make acquisitions themselves 
as a means of expanding, particularly 
internationally.
Entrepreneurial Ecosystems
Businesses do not evolve in a vacuum. 
Rather, they are embedded in a 
geographical context which provides 
them with various resources necessary 
for their start-up and growth. However, 
the quality of this environment varies. 
Hence, whereas high growth firms can 
be found in all types of location (Vaessen 
and Keeble, 1996), they are concentrated 
in certain distinctive environments – 
entrepreneurial ecosystems (Mason and 
Brown, 2014) - that offer the supportive 
culture and specialist resources (e.g. 
human capital, markets, information 
and knowledge) that such firms require. 
Elliason (1996) uses the concept of 
‘competence blocs’, defined as “the 
total infrastructure needed to create 
(innovation), select (entrepreneurship), 
recognise (venture capital provision), 
diffuse (spillovers) and commercially 
exploit (receiver competence) new 
ideas in clusters of firms.” But in 
practice most competence blocs are not 
complete. Where competence blocs are 
incomplete the whole incentive chain 
and structure fails to develop making 
it much harder for the earlier stage 
innovators and entrepreneurial startups 
to enter the markets (Eliasson & Eliasson 
2009). GSVCFs - even though they are 
attempting to fill a missing component 
are therefore unlikely to be effective in 
geographical environments if, as is likely, 
other parts of the competence block are 
also missing.
Conclusion
The paper has argued that the GSVCFs in 
peripheral regions are likely to be largely 
ineffective in stimulating the emergence 
of high growth firms, at least without 
significant complementary initiatives 
to promote entrepreneurial activity. 
Peripheral regions simply lack the 
absorptive capacity to productively invest 
significant additional venture capital. 
There are not sufficient entrepreneurial 
businesses with the potential to grow. 
Moreover, a key element of risk capital 
is that it needs to be smart money and 
it is questionable whether GSVCFs have 
the ability to add significant value to 
their investee companies. New funding 
sources are appropriate in only a small 
number of situations, notably co-
investment schemes alongside business 
angel groups and larger funds (>£1m) so 
as to widen the supply pyramid. There 
is also a need to rethink the investment 
focus, eligibility criteria and structure of 
such funds.
Governments should target their efforts 
on enabling the private sector to invest 
more effectively. These efforts should 
be focused in particular on expanding 
business angel investment activity 
in the regions. Angel networks have 
been effective in the past at enabling 
investments to occur but lacked long 
term finance support and so have closed. 
Promoting managed business angel 
groups has also been demonstrated to 
be an effective approach to expanding 
business angel investment activity. By 
investing together angel groups are able 
to make larger investments and follow-on 
investments, thereby filling some of the 
gaps created by the decline in venture 
capital investing. Angel groups are also 
attractive to high net worth individuals 
who would not otherwise become 
business angels, hence they have a 
positive impact on the supply of finance. 
Indeed, in peripheral regions where the 
number of business angels is likely to be 
limited, connecting ‘smart’ investors with 
‘dumb’ money through angel syndicates 
is an effective way of using this valuable 
but scarce resource (as has occurred 
in Scotland, see Mason et al., 2013). 
Angel syndicates are also essential 
partners in co-investment schemes. 
There should also be support for capacity 
building in the form of investor training 
and investment readiness schemes. 
A further area of intervention is to 
enhance the connectivity of the region’s 
entrepreneurial eco-system to external 
investors by developing networks – or 
pipelines – to bring in out-of-region 
investors to make Series B and Series 
C funding rounds. This approach is 
increasingly being practiced by policy-
makers in other peripheral regions 
(Mason and Baldock, 2015). There is 
the need to enhance the connectivity 
of the different stages of the market 
so that businesses that have raised, 
say, business angel funding, and which 
require additional funding can progress 
seamlessly to a venture capital funding 
round. Rather than simply repairing the 
funding elevator, which perpetuates the 
segmentation of the market, there is a 
requirement for a funding escalator that 
can finance growing businesses in a 
continuous rather than in a discontinuous 
way.
However, in the final analysis policy-
makers in the regions have to assess 
the desirability of a risk-based financial 
system which requires investors to seek 
an exit, normally in the form of a trade 
sale involving the acquisition of the young 
business by an out-of-region, and often 
non-UK business. This does nothing to 
build locally-headquartered businesses; 
indeed, it perpetuates peripheral regions 
as ‘branch plant economies’, albeit with 
different characteristics compared to 
the inward investment era, but with 
adverse implications for the development 
of entrepreneurial labour markets in 
these regions. Rebuilding the funding 
escalator is essential to ensure that 
businesses are not sold prematurely, 
or as distress sales. Encouraging and 
enabling investors to grow some of their 
investee companies so that they become 
candidates for an IPO is also critical. The 
scope for using government sponsored 
funds to establish secondary markets 
which can buy-out some of the shares 
of existing shareholders to provide them 
with liquidity should also be investigated.
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